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Abstract
The article examines the French theoretical concept 
of agencement developed by Gilles Deleuze and Félix 
Guattari and its English translation as assemblage which 
has been widely used in feminist, philosophical, and 
theoretical work. Starting with Jasbir Puar’s critique of 
intersectionality, I argue that although assemblage may 
now be called upon to provide a corrective to intersec-
tionality, not too long ago, intersectionality, with very 
similar arguments, was viewed as the most promising 
alternative to categorical thinking.
Résumé
Cet article traite du concept théorique français de 
l’agencement élaboré par Gilles Deleuze et Félix Guattari 
et de sa traduction en anglais comme assemblage qui a 
été largement utilisé dans les recherches universitaires, 
y compris les analyses féministes ainsi que les travaux 
philosophiques et théoriques. Bien que l’assemblage 
puisse maintenant être appelé à fournir un correctif 
à l’intersectionnalité, il n’y a pas si longtemps, l’inter-
sectionnalité, avec des arguments très similaires, était 
considérée comme l’alternative la plus prometteuse à la 
pensée catégorique.
Introduction 
In her recent work on assemblages, Jasbir Puar 
(2011, 2012) formulates a critique of intersectionality 
within feminist studies and calls for its supplement-
ing and complication. Puar (2007) posits that “inter-
sectional identities are the byproducts of attempts to 
still and quell the perpetual motion of assemblages, to 
capture and reduce them, to harness their threatening 
mobility” (213). Intersectionality can become an alibi 
for re-centering the white, middle-class woman as the 
universal subject of feminism since feminist theorizing 
on the question of difference continues to be “difference 
from” and, in particular, “difference from white wom-
an” (Puar 2012, 53). Intersectionality as a method, Puar 
(2012) argues, has contributed to the reification of iden-
tity categories. Instead, intersectionality should be re-
read as assemblage in order to highlight movement and 
mobility: the subject should be viewed as composed of 
dissipating, indiscreet elements always in the process of 
becoming.  
Intersectionality can be broadly defined as “the 
interaction between gender, race, and other categories 
of difference in individual lives, social practices, in-
stitutional arrangements, and cultural ideologies and 
the outcomes of these interactions in terms of power” 
(Davis 2008, 68). Intersectionality is often traced back 
to Kimberlé Crenshaw’s (1989, 1991) writing on vio-
lence against women of colour and the intersection of 
race and sex with roots in Black feminism and critical 
race theory. Now more than 20 years later, scholars en-
gage in a rich production of intersectional scholarship 
but also in its critique. In her reading of intersection-
ality, in her work on the “queer terrorist,” Puar (2005) 
concludes that some of the main limitations of inter-
sectionality include the presumption that components 
(race, class, gender, sexuality, nation, age, religion) are 
separable analytics but also the notion that intersec-
tionality can become the state’s “tool of diversity man-
agement” or “a mantra of liberal multiculturalism” 
(127-128). 
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In this article, I argue that a re-reading of in-
tersectionality as assemblage calls for a further ex-
amination of assemblage as a theoretical concept, its 
translational history (from French to English, from 
agencement to assemblage), its reception in feminist 
theory, and its potential to supplement or even supplant 
intersectionality or, more pointedly, to act as a cure to 
the ills that have beset the feminist method of intersec-
tionality.2 My main claim is two-fold: i) the project of 
supplementing intersectionality with assemblage theo-
ry needs to re-examine the parallels between the two 
theories, paying particular attention to the notion of 
fluidity in intersectionality; and ii) a historical and lin-
guistic contextualizing can help us understand what is 
at stake in a feminist appropriation of the concept of as-
semblage. A focus on translation is meant to destabilize 
and challenge the dominant position of English in the-
oretical writing and to bring to the fore the complexities 
involved in adopting a concept from one language to 
another, an aspect rarely discussed in English-language 
literature (see Lima Costa and Alvarez 2014).  
I first trace the philosophical origin of assem-
blage in Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari’s philosoph-
ical writings (agencement), including the challenge of 
rendering agencement as assemblage by the translators 
(Dana Polan, Brian Massumi, Hugh Tomlinson and 
Barbara Habberjam, among others). Second, I present 
the feminist reception of Deleuzian philosophy and 
suggest that this initial reluctant reception needs to be 
taken into further account, given the growing schol-
arship employing the concept of assemblage. Third, I 
argue that there are a number of parallels between the 
arguments highlighting the productive uses of assem-
blages and those arguments calling for introduction of 
intersectionality in feminist studies. Both assemblages 
and intersectionality encourage interrogations of what 
a theoretical concept does as opposed to what it is. De-
pending on the way they are developed, both notions 
can be seen to emphasize fluidity and fluctuating pro-
cesses. They have both, at different times, been called 
upon to displace and deconstruct binary logics, univer-
salism, and categorical thinking. Moreover, I return to 
Crenshaw’s (1989) traffic metaphor where discrimina-
tion, rather than identity, is caught in the accident. This 
re-visiting of the traffic metaphor can explain why in-
tersectionality is sometimes viewed as reifying identity 
categories. I conclude with two brief examples of the use 
of assemblage in recent research and a consideration of 
some of the concept’s limitations, in particular as it per-
tains to power relations.
Assemblage and Agencement
The introduction of the concept of assemblage 
in social sciences announces a paradigm shift from “du-
alistic to relational ontological thinking” (Dewsbury 
2011, 148). Conceived of as an ad hoc grouping of di-
verse elements (Kennedy et al. 2013), assemblage fo-
cuses on process and unpredictable, fast-changing rela-
tions, thus not on essence but on adaptivity (Venn 2006, 
107). As such, it has been welcomed by social scientists 
as a kind of thinking that can help us make sense of glo-
balization, including connections, flows, and multiple 
configurations that seem to characterize it: 
New assemblages of social research are clearly required to 
fit together all the ways in which the world is now charac-
terised by flows, connections and becomings whose func-
tioning logic is more about folds than structures, more 
complex than linear, more recursive than dialectical, more 
emergent than totalising. (Dewsbury 2011, 148)
Other scholars have also observed an important shift 
in theorization and methodology in social sciences. 
In addition to a number of other theoretical concepts, 
such as multiplicity, flow, continuum, and structure, 
assemblage was derived from developments in natural 
sciences and mathematics in order to explain the com-
plexity of cultural and social phenomena (Venn 2006; 
Tasić 2001). Assemblage appears at a time when the 
notion of discrete determination supported by positiv-
ism and various forms of structuralism continues to fail 
“to account adequately for change, resistance, agency 
and the event: that is, the irruption of the unexpected 
or unpredictable” (Venn 2006, 107). The borrowing of 
theoretical concepts from mathematics by postmodern 
theorists is not without its problems and has invited its 
share of criticism, most notably for the misuse of math-
ematical and scientific concepts by postmodernism in 
academia (Sokal and Bricmont 1998).3 Similarly, bor-
rowing a theoretical concept from French theory  could 
also potentially open a space for misuse, given the diffi-
culty of finding an adequate equivalent for such a philo-
sophically loaded term with roots in the sciences.
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Theoretical Origins and Context of Agencement in 
French  
Deleuze and Guattari first write of agencement 
in Kafka: Pour une littérature mineure (1975), translat-
ed into English in 1986, within the context of enuncia-
tion and the desiring-production (Bacchetta 2015). For 
Deleuze and Guattari, an agencement is an open mul-
tiplicity, with points of deterritorialization and lines of 
escape (or flight) (1975, 153; 1986, 86). It is a combina-
tion of heterogeneous elements adjusted one to anoth-
er (Callon 2006, 13). Deleuze and Guattari’s theorizing 
must be understood within a specific historical context: 
their writing on agencement invokes disparate elements, 
dynamic constituents, caught in the process of connec-
tion and disconnection, at a time when the dominant 
theories treated social reality as a closed, organic sys-
tem (Bacchetta 2015, para. 19). Agencement is a com-
mon French word that means “arrangement” or “fitting” 
and is used in many different contexts such as arranging 
parts of a machine (Phillips 2006, 108). In theoretical 
writings, there are two main philosophical principles 
that underpin the concept of agencement. First is the 
notion that agencement includes both the subject who 
is acting and the act of arranging, on the one hand, and 
the resultant arrangement itself, on the other. Second, 
agencement includes both human and non-human el-
ements.
 Agencement can suggest the act of arranging 
but also the arrangement itself, therefore encompassing 
both the subject (the agent) and the object (the result). 
What this implies for knowledge production is, as John 
Phillips (2006) explains, that the subject of knowledge is 
not simply “separated out from his [sic] objects, which 
he transforms by making them his project” (108-109); 
the emphasis is on the connection. Thus, in this sense, 
Deleuze and Guattari’s insistence on relations between 
concepts and things, as opposed to an isolated subject 
separated from its objects, can also be seen in Michel 
Callon, John Law, and Bruno Latour’s actor-network 
theory and sociology of associations and relations (La-
tour 2005).4 The emphasis is on connectivity, beyond a 
focus on meaning-making and representation, and on 
the question of what exceeds representation (Kennedy 
et al. 2013, 46). This aspect of agencement then, as I will 
show below, becomes important for theorizing intersec-
tionality. 
Elucidating the term further, Callon (2006) un-
derscores the concept of agency in agencement. Arguing 
against the idea that there is a divide between those who 
arrange and the resultant arrangements, Callon writes: 
“This is why Deleuze and Guattari (1998) proposed the 
notion of agencement. Agencement has the same root 
as agency: agencements are arrangements endowed 
with the capacity of acting in different ways depending 
on their configuration” (13). Rather than viewing an 
agencement as an arrangement separated from the act-
ing subject, we are encouraged to see agencement as al-
ready imbued with agency. The non-discreet parts that 
constitute agencement have agentic capacities, that is, 
agencements in their different configurations are a form 
of distributive agency (Bennett in Kennedy et al. 2013).
Second, agencement includes both human and 
non-human elements. Precisely by rejecting the di-
vision between those who arrange (presumably hu-
mans) and that which is being arranged (non-humans), 
Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of agencement brings into 
play an intermingling of bodies. One example includes 
the feudal agencement which, according to Deleuze and 
Guattari, comprises “the body of the earth and the so-
cial body; the body of the overlord, vassal, and serf; the 
body of the knight and the horse and their new rela-
tion to the stirrup; the weapons and the tools assuring 
a symbiosis of bodies – a whole machinic assemblage” 
(2004/1987, 98). Including both humans and non-hu-
mans then dismantles the delineation between the so-
cial and nature, leaving nothing outside of agencement. 
Deleuze and Guattari (2004/1987) in A Thousand Pla-
teaus further identify agencement as featuring a hori-
zontal and a vertical axis. A horizontal axis comprises 
two segments, content (bodies, actions, passions, an 
intermingling of bodies reacting to one another) and 
expression (acts and statements) (97-98). The vertical 
axis, however, refers to the processes of reterritorializa-
tion which stabilizes the agencement and deterritorial-
ization which carries it away; or, in other words, agence-
ments are continuously being made and becoming un-
made (98).
A Translation History: From Agencement to Assemblage
Not surprisingly, the term agencement has no ex-
act counterpart in English. Some translations, however, 
can be labelled ‘mistranslations’ when they fail to carry 
over the core meaning contained in the original. In this 
respect, “assemblage” as a translation solution can be 
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viewed as a mistranslation. There are two potential ways 
of dealing with this slippage. First, we can ask wheth-
er this mistranslation can have productive effects (Puar 
2011, para. 12). Second, we can adopt a point of view 
that treats the notion of translation as catachresis, “as 
an always already misuse of words, an impropriety and 
inadequacy that underpins all systems of representa-
tion” (Lima Costa and Alvarez 2014, 562; Spivak 1999). 
Not only is translation always embedded in a specific 
cultural and historical context, it also always produces 
an imperfect rendering, not unlike the processes of rep-
resentation. The instability of translation leaves space 
for new meanings that can have, it is hoped, productive 
effects in further knowledge production.  
In the case of assemblage, however, the two 
philosophical principles outlined above complicate 
the translation. In particular, the difficult part about 
translating agencement into English is that, in French, 
it implies both a process and a state of being: both the 
act of fitting/arranging and the arrangement itself. As 
in French, the English word assemblage tends to imply 
only the state of being, therefore eliminating the active 
aspect, the process. Both in English and French, the 
term assemblage emphasizes collection, collage, and 
content as opposed to relations. Agencement was first 
translated as assemblage by Paul Foss and Paul Patton 
in their translation of Deleuze and Guattari’s article 
“Rhizome” which appeared in the journal I & C in 1981 
(Phillips 2006). This translation solution was subse-
quently maintained by other translators, Brian Massu-
mi, Dana Polan, Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habber-
jam, among others, who are also scholars and authors 
in their own fields such as philosophy, law, politics, and 
social theory. Translation solutions provided by Brian 
Massumi in the English rendition of Mille plateaux (A 
Thousand Plateaus) in 1987 have been influential and 
have served as examples for later English translations 
(Habberjam and Tomlinson 2006/1987, x). Translators 
Tomlinson and Habberjam (2006/1987) explain in their 
translators’ introduction to Dialogues II that they fol-
lowed “earlier translations in rendering agencement as 
assemblage” but that the French word has both an active 
and a passive sense (x). 
The translators, whether working on their own 
or in pairs like Tomlinson and Habberjam, through 
their translation solutions necessarily expand the phil-
osophical field in the target language, that is, in English 
in this case. The translators are not only finding linguis-
tic equivalents but are also bending, expanding, and 
pulling Anglo-American philosophy in new directions 
through translational innovation. The responsibility is 
great since the new terms introduced in this way are 
taken up over and over again in further translations and 
theoretical writings. But the great responsibility that 
comes with translating more or less celebrated think-
ers, and frequently French authors, can also catapult 
academics into the wider international academic scene 
as was the case with Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (Der-
rida’s De la grammatologie), Brian Massumi (Deleuze 
and Guattari), and Hazel Barnes (Sartre). As translators, 
they act as intermediaries or as cultural brokers (Spi-
vak 2001). Translation studies scholar André Lefevere 
(1992) argues that translators act as re-writers and that 
translation is effectively a re-writing process which is 
responsible for the general reception and survival of 
original works (or source texts). Viewed in this light, 
assemblage as a translation solution can be seen as an 
act of re-writing which opens up whole new imaginary 
and theoretical spaces.
As agencement has travelled from French-lan-
guage philosophical frameworks into English aca-
demic ones as assemblage, this movement has creat-
ed a slight shift in meaning. The word-play evident in 
the French term agencement – highlighting the role 
of agency and the active aspects in the concept – is 
erased in English, exposing only the state of affairs 
at the detriment of relations and connections. For 
this reason, some scholars in social sciences choose 
to keep the French word agencement in their other-
wise English writing (Hardie and MacKenzie 2007, 
58). In more recent translations of Guattari, however, 
agencement is at times rendered as arrangement as 
follows: “Now the notion of arrangement can be use-
ful here, because it shows that social entities are not 
made up of bipolar oppositions. Complex arrange-
ments place parameters like race, sex, age, national-
ity, etc., into relief ” (Guattari quoted in Puar 2012, 
59). But one could argue that the translation solution 
arrangement is still not satisfactory since it fails to 
account for the actual process of arranging and the 
connectivity between heterogeneous elements. 
If the concept is to gain in currency in the En-
glish academic work, then the “mistranslation” in ques-
tion in English calls for some caution.5 What is lost in 
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translation is a sense of the relationship “between ‘the 
capacity to act [and] the coming together of things’ as 
‘a necessary and prior condition for any action to oc-
cur’, be that human or non-human, organic or inorganic 
(Braun 2008 quoted in Dewsbury 2011, 149). One way 
out of this conundrum, Puar (2012) suggests, is to look 
at what assemblages do as opposed to what they are. 
A linguistic contextualizing through an ex-
amination of translation issues challenges a tak-
en-for-granted practice of adopting theoretical con-
cepts in translation, particularly in English-language 
academic literature (see Descarries 2014). Similarly, a 
historical contextualizing helps us understand what is 
at stake in a feminist appropriation of the concept of 
assemblage. In the following section, I propose to bring 
the focus on the ways in which both the concept of as-
semblage and intersectionality can be thought through 
the notions of fluidity and (in)separability.
From Assemblage to Intersectionality: Making the 
Connections
An overview of the feminist reception of Deleu-
zo-Guattarian philosophy reveals that in the past femi-
nist scholars have been highly critical but have nonethe-
less proceeded cautiously to engage with their philoso-
phy of connectivity. As a growing number of scholars 
apply Deleuzo-Guattarian concepts, a revisiting of this 
reception and initial reservations offers a platform for 
critical engagement. I highlight a number of parallels in 
arguments proposing assemblages and intersectionality 
to show that their deployment in research arises from a 
similar set of concerns, in particular from the attempts 
to find alternatives to reification and static conceptual-
ization of identity. 
Elizabeth Grosz (1993, 1994) was one of the 
first scholars to weigh in on feminist engagement and 
reception of Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy. Grosz 
(1994) observes a paradoxical vacillation in feminist 
writing between equally strong criticism of and fasci-
nation with their philosophy: “[Rosi Braidotti] is clear 
in her ambivalences, her unresolved relation to and 
against Deleuze’s writings—as, it seems to me, femi-
nists must be if they are on one hand to benefit from 
men’s modes of production of knowledges while on the 
other hand moving beyond them in recognizing their 
limitations” (162). In her summary of feminist critique 
of Deleuzian philosophy, Grosz (1993) argues that there 
are valid reasons feminist scholars should remain sus-
picious of masculine interests and metaphors, models 
of machines, assemblages and connections, as well as 
references to manifestly misogynist writers. Feminist 
scholars should remain “critical of an apparently phal-
lic drive to plug things, make connections, link with 
things” (167). Nonetheless, it is a worthwhile endeav-
our, Grosz maintains, to examine concepts, such as rhi-
zomatics, assemblages, multiplicity, and becoming, in 
the hope that they can help feminist theory displace the 
binary logic in Western philosophy which has been so 
pervasive in regimes of oppression, including the op-
pression of women.  
In their edited volume titled Deleuze and Femi-
nist Theory, Ian Buchanan and Claire Colebrook (2000) 
address directly the question of compatibility between 
Deleuzian philosophy and feminist theory. The rela-
tionship between feminist theory and Deleuze and 
Guattari’s theoretical concepts seems to be a rather 
difficult one, full of hesitation and distrust but also of 
curiosity. The main issue raised by feminist scholars 
revolves around Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of be-
coming and, in particular, becoming-woman.6 In the 
volume’s introduction, Colebrook (2000) engages with 
their philosophy but is never quite at ease with it. Re-
ferring to Deleuze and Guattari’s writings on Virginia 
Woolf, becoming-woman, and molar identities  (based 
on divisions, binary codes, and oppositions), she asks: 
“Just what are Deleuze and Guattari doing when they 
take Woolf and the women’s movement away from the 
concepts of identity, recognition, emancipation and 
the subject towards a new plane of becoming?” (3). 
Although Grosz (1993) remains highly suspicious of 
Deleuze and Guattari’s process of becoming-woman, 
she maintains that feminist theory should not shun or 
ignore Deleuzian philosophy but has much to gain from 
it without having to abandon feminist political projects. 
Grosz understands becoming-woman as “destabiliza-
tion of molar (feminine) identity” (177) and Jerry Aline 
Flieger (2000) describes it as “the paradigmatic instance 
of changing one’s perspective, one’s very essence, one’s 
very status as ‘one’” (39). Assemblages, as conglomer-
ates of heterogeneous elements in symbiosis and in con-
stant transformation, are understood in their connec-
tion with becoming, a continuous process between two 
states, a “betweenness” which displaces and disorients 
the subject and identities (43). Within this framework 
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then, becoming-woman is about transforming and 
transgressing identity. 
While some feminist theorists (Grosz 1993, 
1994; Braidotti 2011) remain critical of Deleuze and 
Guattari’s philosophy, they nonetheless call for an en-
gagement with their concepts which, if theorized with 
caution, can offer a number of solutions to challenges 
currently posed by feminist theory. Viewed in this light, 
Puar (2012) posits that Deleuze-Guattarian assemblag-
es can be a productive way of formulating epistemolog-
ical correctives to the feminist knowledge production 
which, mainly driven by intersectional analysis, has 
produced a normative subject of feminism. Neither as-
semblages nor intersectionality are to be dismissed but 
assemblages are useful since they “encompass not only 
ongoing attempts to destabilize identities and grids, but 
also the forces that continue to mandate and enforce 
them” (63). It is suggested that what intersectionality 
sees as separate, assemblages bring together as there is 
nothing outside the assemblage.
Within the context of intersectionality, the no-
tion of separability is pertinent since it raises the ques-
tion of whether the intersecting entities are indeed dis-
creet and distinct from one another. Lena Gunnarsson 
(2015) takes up the either/or thinking which character-
izes much of the intersectionality scholarship regard-
ing the debate on in/separability of intersectional cat-
egories. Gunnarsson uses Roy Bhaskar’s dialectial crit-
ical realist philosophy, in particular the figure of uni-
ty-in-difference, to argue that intersectional categories 
are both separate and unified. She questions the unclear 
meaning of ‘inseparability’ and exposes the ambiguity 
in stating that different categories (gender, sexuality, 
race, class, etc.) are not separable while at the same time 
separating them in the very statements (4-5). Nira Yu-
val-Davis’ (2006) influential writing on intersectionality 
warns that intersectional analysis is not meant to dis-
cover several neat identities under one since this would 
reinscribe the notion of the fragmented, additive model 
of oppression. However, she cautions that we need to 
differentiate between different kinds of difference, that 
is, between different social divisions: “[The] ontologi-
cal basis of each of these divisions is autonomous, and 
each prioritizes different spheres of social relations” 
(200-201). Gunnarsson (2015) complicates Yuval-Da-
vis’ position and stresses “that even if analysed on the 
deepest level of abstraction, I doubt that we can think of 
economic, gendered, sexual and racialized relations as 
absolutely independent from one another. I am unsure 
how starkly Yuval-Davis’ claim about autonomy should 
to be [sic] interpreted” (6).
 This notion of separateness or autonomy of 
ontological bases of social divisions or intersectional 
categories can be seen in stark contrast to Deleuzian 
philosophy which refuses to engage in traditional meta-
physics and questions of the ontological identity of an 
entity. Rather, Deleuze and Guattari ask what things do 
as opposed to what they are. Entities enter assemblag-
es through connections and engage in movement that 
should be thought as movement “rather than arrested 
and identified” (Currier 2003, 332). Dianne Currier 
(2003) sees this refusal to engage with ontological differ-
ences between beings, which are based on their essential 
identities, not as unification and creation of sameness 
but rather as a “refusal of a mode of knowledge ordered 
by identity” (332). Currier further explains: 
To claim that assemblages are not grounded on a frame-
work of identity is not, however, to claim an exemption 
for assemblages from the matrices of power/knowledge 
through which the logic of identity has proliferated and 
been active historically. It is to claim that the concept of as-
semblage is not elaborated through and cannot be grasped 
by the epistemological frameworks of identity. (333) 
This move then signifies a more complex relationship 
with the matrices of power and a move away from be-
ing to becoming, that is, a move away from identity, 
the One, and the oppositional binary logic of West-
ern philosophy, as Grosz (1993) argues, leading to an 
open-ended epistemological horizon. 
It appears at first that the fundamental modes 
of knowledge production in assemblages are in con-
tradiction with intersectionality. While Puar’s (2012) 
re-reading of Crenshaw’s (1989) foundational text—to 
show that intersectionality can be seen as more invest-
ed in movement and flows than in reified identities—is 
instructive, it can be further nuanced. In her attempt 
to illustrate the ways in which Black women experience 
“double-discrimination” (on the basis of both race and 
sex), Crenshaw (1989) writes: 
The point is that Black women can experience discrimi-
nation in any number of ways and that the contradiction 
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arises from our assumptions that their claims of exclusion 
must be unidirectional. Consider an analogy to traffic in 
an intersection, coming and going in all four directions. 
Discrimination, like traffic through an intersection, may 
flow in one direction, and it may flow in another. If an ac-
cident happens in an intersection, it can be caused by cars 
traveling from any number of directions and, sometimes, 
from all of them. Similarly, if a Black woman is harmed 
because she is in the intersection, her injury could result 
from sex discrimination or race discrimination. (149)
After quoting Crenshaw’s passage on the now-famous 
metaphor of the traffic accident, Puar (2012) concludes 
that “identification is a process; identity is an encoun-
ter, an event, an accident, in fact” (59). Puar makes an 
interesting shift in her reading of the traffic metaphor: 
where Crenshaw is referring to “discrimination,” Puar is 
reading “identification.” 
Rather than viewing identity as that which is 
caught in the accident, as arrested movement on the 
grid, Crenshaw’s metaphor invokes discrimination as 
that which is flowing through the intersection. In this 
re-visiting of Crenshaw’s metaphor, intersectionality is 
intended to emphasize structures of inequality. In their 
introduction to an issue of the journal Signs dedicated 
to intersectionality, Sumi Cho, Kimberlé Crenshaw, and 
Leslie McCall (2013) provide a critique of those works 
which treat intersectionality as a theory fascinated with 
overlapping identities: “While this theme has surfaced 
in a variety of texts, particularly those that might be 
framed as projects that seek intersectionality’s rescue, 
in this issue we emphasize an understanding of inter-
sectionality that is not exclusively or even primarily 
preoccupied with categories, identities, and subjectiv-
ities” (797). Instead, the authors foreground political 
and structural inequalities.
Moreover, Puar (2012) uses this re-reading of 
Crenshaw to argue for the usefulness of assemblages as 
a theoretical concept that can “focus on the patters of 
relations—not the entities themselves, but the patterns 
within which they are arranged with each other…Not 
Assemblage, but Agencement.” (60-61). However, an of-
fering of such a re-reading needs to be contextualized 
and placed in dialogue with the works of other inter-
sectionality scholars who have theorized intersection-
ality through the lens of doing rather than being: “In-
tersectionality primarily concerns the way things work 
rather than who people are” (Chun et al. cited in Cho, 
Crenshaw, and McCall 2013, 797; my emphasis). Here, 
Cho, Crenshaw, and McCall (2013) see critiques of in-
tersectionality’s supposed reification of categories as re-
flecting distorted understandings of identity politics. In 
a similar vein, Cho, Crenshaw, and McCall reflect on 
the astonishing growth of intersectionality scholarship 
and observe that “[This] framing—conceiving of cate-
gories not as distinct but as always permeated by other 
categories, fluid and changing, always in the process of 
creating and being created by dynamics of power—em-
phasizes what intersectionality does rather than what 
intersectionality is” (795). Once again, a renewed em-
phasis on doing (actions, events) and a distancing from 
being (descriptions of entities) reconstruct a familiar 
perspective that is also seen in writings on assemblages.
Kathy Davis (2008) in her article “Intersection-
ality as Buzzword” notes that, while intersectionality is 
most often associated with the U.S. Black feminist the-
ory and the political project of theorizing the relation-
ships between gender, class, and race, it has also been 
taken up by feminist scholars working with postmod-
ern theories. These scholars welcomed intersectionality 
as a “helpmeet in their project of deconstructing the 
binary oppositions and universalism inherent in the 
modernist paradigms of Western philosophy and sci-
ence” (71). Moreover, they viewed intersectionality as 
capable of neatly fitting into the “postmodern project 
of conceptualizing multiple and shifting identities” (71).
In her account of the history of intersectionality 
in feminist theory and feminist political projects, Davis 
(2008) highlights a point that is instructive for the issues 
at stake here. As intersectionality was taken up, in the 
1980s and onwards, by both feminist political projects 
and feminist theorists inspired by postmodern theoret-
ical concepts, their motivations differed. For the theo-
rists of class/race/gender, intersectionality and identity 
politics were an effective strategy of resistance, while 
for the postmodern feminist theorists, intersectionality 
provided a way out of gender essentialism and toward 
abandoning categorical thinking (73). Intersectionality 
has provided a common footing for both groups of fem-
inists since it is able to tackle the feminist political proj-
ect “of making the social and material consequences of 
the categories of gender/race/class visible, but does so 
by employing methodologies compatible with the post-
structuralist project of deconstructing categories, un-
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masking universalism, and exploring the dynamic and 
contradictory workings of power” (74). Davis shows the 
ways in which the introduction of intersectionality had 
the potential to reconcile the two strands of feminist 
scholarship. In this light, Puar’s (2012) suggestion to 
supplement intersectionality with assemblages can be 
seen as further expansion. However, depending on the 
theoretical point of view, such supplementing may be 
viewed as unnecessary, given that re-readings of origi-
nating literature on intersectionality, as argued by Cho, 
Crenshaw, and McCall (2013), may suffice in resolving 
the current tensions in intersectionality scholarship 
(788). The re-visiting of the traffic-accident metaphor 
is a case in point.
Assemblage in Social Science Research 
While feminist reception of Deleuzo-Guattarian 
philosophy has been marked by hesitation, as illustrat-
ed above, a number of examples show that scholars are 
cautiously proceeding and finding productive ways of 
deploying assemblages in their research. I suggest that it 
is worth exploring the ways in which these more recent 
formulations of research questions may not supplement 
but rather supplant intersectionality. The following two 
examples illustrate the shift that assemblages can bring 
to social sciences research and to highlight the ways in 
which they can differ from intersectionality. The au-
thors deploy the concepts from Deleuze and Guattari 
but their primary aim is not the usage itself of Deleu-
zo-Guattarian concepts but rather the rearticulation of 
their research questions within the context of their own 
disciplines. The themes taken up by these two studies, 
sexuality and masculinities, on the one hand, and race 
and gender on the other, could have been interpreted 
through the lens of intersectionality; however, the au-
thors advocate explicitly for an approach that empha-
sizes process, connections, effects, and doing rather 
than being or meaning-making. Their choices of meth-
odology are telling of the paradigmatic shift that pro-
poses capturing encounters, events, and affect.
One example is the way male sexuality and mas-
culinity can be studied through the lens of the “sexual-
ity-assemblages” of teen boys and young men (Alldred 
and Fox 2015). Pam Alldred and Nick Fox (2015) take 
the focus away from socialization and/or identity-con-
struction and explore sexuality, sexual desire, and the 
physicality of sexual practices. The authors foreground 
the fluctuating assemblages and the events they produce 
in order to “firmly [shift] the focus away from bodies 
and individuals toward relationality and assemblages, to 
affective flows in place of human agency, toward capac-
ities to act, feel and desire rather than bodily attributes” 
(910). Moreover, they opt to focus on “an impersonal af-
fective flow within assemblages of bodies, things, ideas 
and social institutions” and not on an individual sexed 
body (907). In this approach, hegemonic masculinity 
is not viewed as an explanation of young men’s hetero-
sexual identities but is to be “explained at the level of 
actions, interactions and event” (917).
Similar to the first example, the authors in the 
second example use a language that clearly announces 
a move away from concerns around the “foundation” 
of a subject’s identity. Rosanne Kennedy et al. (2013) 
are interested in moving the concept of agency beyond 
the human body to include nonhuman entities. In one 
of the three case studies, Kennedy et al. analyse Mi-
ley Cyrus’s performance at the Video Music Awards 
through assemblage theory. Instead of focusing solely 
on Miley Cyrus as the subject who twerked, Kennedy et 
al. study the assemblage of the Twerking Miley Cyrus 
Body (TMCB) as a recurrent event, affect, and ongoing 
process. This formulation allows them to ask not what 
TMCB means with regards to race and gender but rath-
er to identify TMCB’s capacity. The wide and repetitive 
availability (through GIFs, YouTube, etc.) of TMCB 
prompts the authors to ask: if TMCB is happening again 
and again, what is it doing as opposed to what did it once 
do? Importantly, the authors consider the ways in which 
TMCB contributed to re-fixing identities (the black ver-
sus white body, the female body as sexual) as well as 
the role of sensations (56). Both examples are excellent 
illustrations of a flexible, innovative but also critical 
approach to Deleuzian concepts. Spaces for a “friction-
al,” but complementing, dialogue between assemblage 
and intersectionality are, however, less obvious. These 
examples, among others, illustrate a form of distancing 
from the body, identity (assumed to be fixed), represen-
tation, and social institutions to focus on movement, 
entities, and events. The appeal of the concept of assem-
blage seems to lie in the apparent possibility to grasp the 
effect of encounters produced by assemblages. 
Assemblages, however, have their own limita-
tions. Paola Bacchetta (2015) posits that, while assem-
blages can supplement intersectionality, they do not nec-
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essarily take into account certain power relations, which 
can remain invisible, such as the role of colonialism in 
the construction of queer subjects in the West (para. 
23). To counter these limitations, Bacchetta proposes 
two other theoretical concepts, that is, co-formations 
and co-productions. Co-formations are used to think 
through dynamic, contextual, and localized power rela-
tions such as gender, sexuality, racism, class, caste, dis-
ability, and speciesism; and co-productions allow us to 
think through broad, thick, and intense power relations 
spanning over wide spatiotemporalities such as global 
capitalism, colonialism, neo-colonialism, and occupa-
tion (para. 27-28). Once again, there is an attempt to 
supplement intersectionality while co-production and 
co-formation are seen as attempts to further decolonize 
feminism. Nevertheless, the shift away from identity is 
still seen as unsettling. Alexander G. Weheliye (2014) 
calls for caution regarding “the complete disavowal of 
subjectivity in theoretical discourse, because within the 
context of the Anglo-American academy more often 
than not an insistence on transcending limited notions 
of the subject or identity leads to the neglect of race as a 
critical category” (48).7 This critique brings us yet again 
to the thorny questions of power relations and identity, 
as the limitations of the assemblages lie in their evacua-
tion of the notions of power, ideology, and the political. 
One solution, however, can be to “put [assemblages] to 
work in milieus” such as racialized minority discourse 
and queer theory (47).
Conclusion
When evaluating possibilities of re-reading in-
tersectionality as assemblage, I have argued that it is in-
structive to pay attention to translation as an innovative 
research approach. Translation is itself a very political 
act and translation flows in academia and elsewhere are 
not coincidental but are rather reflections of geopolitics, 
socio-historical moments, and power relations (Descar-
ries 2014). When we grasp the difficulties of translating 
a theoretical term into English (or into any language), 
we are able to evaluate it more critically, including its 
functions and productive possibilities. I have also sug-
gested that there are a number of parallels between the 
arguments highlighting the productive uses of assem-
blages and those arguments reaffirming the importance 
of intersectionality. Both assemblages and intersec-
tionality encourage interrogations of what a theoretical 
concept does as opposed to what it is; both notions can 
be seen to emphasize fluidity and changing processes 
with the potential to displace and deconstruct binary 
logics, universalism, and categorical thinking. These 
parallels, or repetitions, reveal the continuing struggle 
to unseat dualisms and reification in Western modes of 
knowledge production. Although assemblage may be 
now called in to provide a corrective to intersectional-
ity, not too long ago, intersectionality was viewed to be 
the most promising alternative to reification of identity. 
While feminist scholars have been reluctant to engage 
with Deleuzo-Guattarian philosophy in the past, the 
new research signals that cautious use of assemblages in 
academic research may appear increasingly attractive to 
some scholars. The two examples, with their attention 
focused on events, affects, and relationality, illustrate 
the ways in which assemblages can be deployed in so-
cial science research, potentially signalling the so-called 
paradigm shift. Within this type of research, intersec-
tionality just may be more likely to be supplanted rath-
er than supplemented by assemblages. In this article, 
I have argued that suggestions to employ assemblag-
es should keep in view the particularities of previous 
historical searches for alternatives. Lastly, in an age of 
advanced capitalist globalization, the functioning logic 
of the world we live in today is “more about folds than 
structures, more complex than linear, more recursive 
than dialectical, more emergent than totalising” (Dews-
bury 2011, 148). In such a nondialectical and multilo-
cal world, then, we are left with an increasingly difficult 
task of mapping sites of power and its effects and inter-
sectionality and assemblage are examples of this endur-
ing struggle for theoretical alternatives. 
Endnotes
1 A version of this article was presented in April 2013 at the 35th 
anniversary conference of the Simone de Beauvoir Institute, Con-
cordia University, Montreal, Canada. I would like to thank the 
anonymous reviewers as well as Deniz Durmuz for their insightful 
suggestions for improvement.
2 Legal scholars such as Devon Carbado (2013) and Sumi Cho 
(2013) have argued that making space for “new and improved” 
analytical frameworks need not culminate in calls to erase or su-
persede intersectionality (Cho 2013, 389). Carbado (2013) cites 
“cosynthesis,” “inter-connectivity,” “multidimensionality,” and “as-
semblages” as improved candidates: “Proponents of these theories 
implicitly and sometimes explicitly suggest that each has the inher-
ent ability to do something–discursively and substantively – that 
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intersectionality cannot do or does considerably less well” (815-
816).
3 Mathematicians, however, question postmodern theorists’, includ-
ing Deleuze and Guattari’s, use of mathematical concepts. Vladimir 
Tasić (2001) asserts that “postmodern theorists produced a series 
of brave utterances that make little sense mathematically” (149).
4 For an overview of the differences and similarities between La-
tour, Callon, and Law’s actor-network theory and Deleuze-Guat-
tarian assemblages, see Muller (2015).
5 Francine Descarries (2014) writes: “While translation makes it 
possible to disseminate ideas to a certain extent, there are never-
theless few concepts or models of interpretation that can be shared 
among different cultures in a completely analogous fashion” (566). 
The case of the assemblage is a good illustration of the ways in 
which theoretical concepts carry their own theoretical and cultural 
baggage.
6 Due to space restrictions, I focus on the concept of assemblage. 
However, Deleuze and Guattari employ a number of other crucial 
concepts such as becoming, becoming-woman, Body without Or-
gans, rhizome, multiplicities, molar, molecular, lines of flight, ter-
ritorialization, etc., all of which work together to elucidate their 
philosophical principles. For a detailed analysis of these concepts, 
see Currier (2003), Grosz (1993, 1994), among many others and in 
addition to Deleuze and Guattari (2004/1987).
7 For a critique of the ways in which intersectionality has been neu-
tralized and race erased in intersectionality scholarship (and, in 
particular, in sociology), see Sirma Bilge’s (2013) work.
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